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I. INTRODUCTION
I have been asked to speak about the status of the negotiations on the draft
agreement on Liability for Damage to the Antarctic Environment, which are
being undertaken by the Parties to the Antarctic Treaty, and their prospects for
success.
There are some key points I'd like to make at the outset:
(1) The parties to the Antarctic Treaty have a legal obligation to conclude
an agreement on Liability. This follows from Article 16 of the Protocol on
Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (which entered into force on
14 January 1998), which provides:
[tihe Parties undertake to elaborate rules and procedures relating to
liability for damage arising from activities taking place in the
Antarctic Treaty area and covered by this Protocol.. Those rules and
procedures shall be included in one or more Annexes.
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(2) While the issues of legal liability for environmental damage are notably
complex in whatever context, they are particularly difficult in the Antarctic
context. Unlike other liability negotiations, in the case of Antarctica there is no
economic or commercial enterprise involved which will ultimately bear the cost
of liability (and which can build it into its cost structure). In Antarctic the
activity is primarily governmental and science related, and that's where most
of the burden will fall. Moreover the liability regime will cover damage to the
environment per se - not to the economic interests of others (although that may
be a minor element of it) - and will be extremely difficult to quantify. The
Antarctic environment is a unique and fragile one, and impacts are difficult to
assess, although we may perhaps be able to draw on American experience in
Alaska. Overlying all of this is the complication that in Antarctica we are not
dealing with undisputed sovereign territory.
(3) The Antarctic Treaty parties have however shown themselves able in
the past to resolve the most complex of issues. The Antarctic Treaty itself
reflects a unique capacity for problem-solving.
(4) The United States is key to a successful outcome. The Liability Annex
will have to be adopted by consensus by Antarctic Treaty parties, and will have
to be ratified by all parties. At the moment many countries are sheltering
behind the United States position, and are not declaring themselves. If the
United States comes to the party, these other countries will have to as well. The
United States also hhs a huge capacity for "creative lawyering," of the sort that
is required here to try and solve the issues. We need active United States
engagement.
(5) We need some lateral thinking to break the current impasse, and as
American lawyers you are well placed to provide it.
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS
What we have now is a stalemate, polarized around two competing texts
and quite different approaches. One is the so-called "Eighth Offering" - a
Chairman's text produced by Professor Rudiger Wolfrum who chaired a "Legal
Experts Group" dealing with Antarctic Liability, which was set up by the
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties and held nine meetings over six years
until it was transformed into a fully fledged negotiating group at this year's
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting in Lima, Peru. The other text is the
"United States draft," which was introduced by the United States three and a
half years ago at a meeting of the Legal Experts Group in Utrecht, Netherlands.
A. The Eighth Offering
As its name implies, this Chairman' s text is in its eighth revision. It is the
Chairman's personal product, although it does of course reflect considerable
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input from delegations. It takes a comprehensive approach to the issue of
liability for environmental damage, and is highly complex, reflecting the
application of impressive of intellectual capital by the Chairman, but it also
leaves many issues unresolved. The basic framework (as yet not entirely
agreed) is as follows:
(1) Operators conducting activities in the Antarctic incur liability
if they cause damage to the Antarctic environment;
(2) Damage is defined as any harmful effect of an impact on the
Antarctic environment, which is over a particular threshold (to
exclude de minimus), with certain exceptions including for
impacts identified during an environmental evaluation process;
(3) Liability is strict (and also probably joint and several where
several operators are involved);
(4) An operator is required to take reasonable precautionary
measures, and also to take response action where an incident
occurs;
(5) When an operator does not take response action another State
Party, or in certain circumstances another entity or person, may
do so;
(6) The operator is then liable to reimburse the reasonable costs of
the other party for the response action they have taken;
(7) Where the damage to the environment cannot be repaired, the
operator has to contribute an amount to an "Environmental
Protection Fund," by processes yet to be determined;
(8) The Fund would be used to compensate States and other entities
for the costs of response action in those situations where
liability (and reimbursement) do not attach;
(9) There would be financial limits on liability;
10) Non State operators would be required to take out insurance or
other financial security to cover liability;
(11) States Parties would have residual liability for damage caused
by their operators, but only to the extent that they have failed to
carry out their own obligations as a State Party; and
(12) A dispute settlement regime would be included.
As I have said, this is a comprehensive and complex regime. While the
general framework is there, and some provisions have been exhaustively
discussed and are close to finality, others are much less so. A great deal
remains to be resolved.
B. The United States Proposal
The United States draft is much simpler. It takes a less comprehensive
approach than the Eighth Offering, and is designed to cover "environmental
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emergencies" only. Article 15 of the Protocol on Environmental Protection to
the Antarctic Treaty imposes an obligation on Parties to take response action
in the event of emergencies, and under the United States proposal liability
would attach only where a Party failed to take such action. An element of the
United States Proposal is, however, that a further annex or annexes could be
drawn up to cover other aspects of liability for environmental damage.
C. The Different Positions
The United States draft was introduced at a time when the liability
discussions had been going through a particularly bleak period, with little
progress being made on the Chairman's current "Offering." The United States
introduced its proposal to try and break the stalemate. Its introduction
coincided, however, with a spurt of progress on the Chairman's "offering," with
the result that many delegations viewed the United States text as an unnecessary
distraction from the main game.
Since that time' modest progress has continued on the Chairman's
"offerings" although, as noted, a great many issues remain to be resolved. For
its part, the United States text has remained on the table, and continues to
reflect the United States position (as well as that of some other countries).
Accordingly, the future elaboration of a liability regime is bedeviled by a
fundamental difference of approach between delegations. This is over the basic
question of whether we should be seeking to elaborate a so-called "comprehen-
sive" (or single) annex, or a so-called "limited" annex (which could be the first
in a series of annexes focussing on particular aspects of the liability problem).
Until this fundamental issue is resolved there will inevitably be limits as to the
further progress that will be possible.
D. The Need for a ".Third Way"
The two approaches have been extensively debated in the past, without
resolution, and it is fair to say that further debate between these two options per
se is unlikely to resolve the matter. With neither side willing to move from its
basic position, delegations have increasingly talked of the need for a 'Third
Way" - that is to say, an approach which is neither the "comprehensive"
approach or the "limited" approach, but which bridges the two positions or
takes yet another road.
Ideally, too, it should also be designed to make the work more manageable.
As the discussion of Antarctic Liability has developed, there has been an
increase in the magnitude and number of issues needing to be negotiated, which
adds to the complexity of pulling together a package as such. And as the
potential time span for producing a concrete outcome has grown commensu-
rately, there is inevitably a danger that the negotiating process will flag.
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Moreover, as we shall have to produce an outcome which can be adopted by
consensus, and which can then be ratified by all Parties within a reasonable
time, size and complexity is unlikely to assist such an outcome.
At the end of the negotiations on liability which I chaired, at the Lima
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting earlier this year, that is the challenge
which I put to delegations.
While the Lima negotiations had made progress in some areas, it was
apparent to me that resolution of these fundamental differences in position was
required.
My Personal Report to the Lima ATCM, as Chairman, which is annexed
to this paper, canvasses this question. It also identifies one possible "Third
Way," which would comprise the following:
(1) a single annex providing for a comprehensive regime, thus
meeting the objectives of many delegations. The annex itself
would include all the generic items which would be common to
a liability regime of whatever nature, and in respect of which
there is already agreement or agreement is foreseeable. It
would utilize a great deal of work already done and (without
wishing to minimize unduly the complexity of the issues
remaining)could, hopefully, be developed reasonably quickly.
(2) It would contain a binding commitment to subsequently develop
detailed schedules, by way of measures, on (1) Preventative
Measures, (2) Damage from Environmental Emergencies, (3)
Response Action and Remedial Action, and (4) Unrepaired and
Irreparable damage. (Using measures to build on the Annex
would not be an entirely novel concept; all of the other An-
nexes to the Protocol can be amended or modified by way of
measures, which are adopted by consensus).
This approach would also have the advantage of reducing. our work to
reasonably digestible bites. It would enable a step by step approach while
meeting the positions of delegations wanting a single annex and comprehensive
coverage.
I stress that this is not the only way through this impasse. And it may not
be without its own difficulties. It has been suggested to me, for example, that
there might be difficulty getting the United States' Senate to ratify an Annex
which was "open-ended" in this way. My response would be that the Antarctic
Treaty, which has been ratified by the United States, is similarly open-ended,
in that it allows measures to be adopted subsequently which are "binding" on
States. My proposal would be no more open-ended than that. And, as with the
adoption of measures under the Antarctic treaty, a consensus would be required
MacKay2000]
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for their adoption, which would require specific United States agreement in
each instance.
F_ The Next Steps
What is now needed is some lateral thinking. This is where we need your
help. I have the greatest admiration for the creativity of American lawyers, and
I don't believe that. the current dilemma is insurmountable. We need a "third
Way." Would the proposal in my report work, or can you see another "third
Way." I'm sure you can come up with an answer to this, unfettered by
governmental positions. If you cannot do it today then maybe you or (if you are
involved in the academic area) your students, can do it subsequently. It's a
great case study. And we would very much welcome your contribution.
Ell. ANNEX'
As indicated in the Report of Working Group I on Item 10, this paper is
circulated, on a personal basis, in an endeavor to identify a way forward. It
should be viewed purely in that light.
As is also evident from the Report of Working Group 1 on Item 10, there
was useful progress in a number of respects in this first round of negotiations
in the Working Group. The Report identifies various areas of convergence, and
it is fair to say that other prospective areas of progress can also be seen at this
stage. Ultimately, however, what we are talking about is a package, or several
packages, and convergence is not likely to develop in some key areas until the
overall shape of the package (or packages)is clearer.
Some valuable work was also done in the informal contact groups, which
were set up to facilitate discussion on a range of subjects. The coordinators of
some of these groups were able to produce texts reflecting the stage reached in
their discussions, and as I foreshadowed in Working Group 1, these are attached
as a matter of record so that this work is not lost. It must be clear, however, that
these texts do not reflect agreed positions, either on the part of those participat-
ing in the informal contact groups or the meeting as a whole. They are simply
to aid further discussion. Indeed, some delegations specifically entered
reservations in respect of some of these texts, and on others there was not time
for discussion.
On the basis of comments made in the meeting, and to me informally, I
think it will be useful in future meetings to continue using informal contact
groups to help clarify differences between delegations on particular issues - and
hopefully identify solutions - as this is sometimes difficult across the confer-
ence floor. It needs to be emphasized that such groups are open ended (that is
1. Personal report of the chairman on the liability discussion in WGI.
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to say, open to all delegations with an interest in the issue in question), although
this of course creates a practical limitation on the number of groups which can
be established at any one time, given the pressure on small delegations.
Another very useful development at this meeting, was a much more
integrated approach involving SCAR and COMNAP. This helped inform the
discussion, even though both organizations were not able to be present for all
of the time, and points the way towards an even more integrated approach in the
future, including outside of formal meetings. For example, future informal
contact groups on some issues are likely to benefit from being multi-disciplined,
and having in them scientists and operators as well as lawyers and policy
experts. It may also be appropriate to include other representative organizations
on occasion, such as IAATO on behalf of tourism operators.
Notwithstanding these positive and encouraging developments, however,
the future elaboration of a liability regime remains bedeviled by a fundamental
difference of approach between delegations. This is over the basic question of
whether we should be seeking to elaborate a so-called "comprehensive" (or
single) annex, or a so-called "limited" annex (which could be the first in a
series of annexes focussing on particular aspects of the liability problem). Until
this fundamental issue is resolved there will inevitably be limits as to the further
progress that will be possible.
This issue has been extensively debated in the past, without resolution, and
it is fair to say that further debate between these two options per se is unlikely
to resolve the matter. On the one hand, it is clear that many delegations are
now willing to negotiate on the basis of a so-called "limited" annex, which
would involve a fundamental departure from their position. Other delegations,
however, are unwilling to negotiate on the basis of the sort of "comprehensive"
approach that would follow the approach of the eighth offering, as this would
depart from their fundamental position. This in no way derogates from the
hugely useful work done in the Group of Legal Experts, and the Chairman's
offerings, as acknowledged at the Tromso ATCM. It is entirely due to that
work that we are able to identify the issues involved in putting together an
Antarctic liability regime, together with a range of possible solutions (it is also
worth noting that other bodies outside of the Antarctic Treaty System have
found liability issues extraordinarily complex and difficult to solve). We are,
however, now in a new phase of our work, that of negotiation in Working
Group 1 as mandated by the Tromso ATCM.
That new phase, and the fundamental differences that I have referred to,
suggest that we should now be looking for a new approach which bridges the
two positions or takes yet another road. Ideally, it should also be designed to
make our work more manageable. As the discussion of Antarctic Liability has
developed, there has been an increase in the magnitude and number of issues
needing to be negotiated, which adds to the complexity of pulling together a
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package as such. And as the potential time span for producing a concrete
outcome has grown commensurately, there is inevitably a danger that the
negotiating process will flag. Moreover, what we shall have to produce is an
outcome which can be adopted by consensus, and which can then be ratified by
all Parties within a reasonable time. Size and complexity is unlikely to assist
such an outcome.
Attached to this document is one possible new approach, which would
bridge the fundamental differences I have referred to. There may be others
which occur to delegations, but it is in terms of a new approach that I believe
we should now be thinking.
The approach attached is a framework for a liability regime as follows:
1) a single annex providing for a comprehensive regime, thus
meeting the objectives of many delegations. The annex itself
would include all the generic items which would be common to
a liability regime of whatever nature, and in respect of which
there is already agreement or agreement is foreseeable. It
would utilize a great deal of work already done and (without
wishing to minimize unduly the complexity of the issues
remaining)could, hopefully, be developed reasonably quickly.
2) It would contain abinding commitment to subsequently develop
detailed schedules, by way of measures, on 1) Preventative
Measures, 2) Damage from Environmental Emergencies, 3)
Response Action and Remedial Action, and 4) Unrepaired and
Irreparable damage. (Using measures to build on the Annex
would not be an entirely novel concept; all of the other An-
nexes to the Protocol can of course be amended or modified by
way of measures, which are adopted by consensus).
This approach would also have the advantage of reducing our work to
reasonably digestible bites. It would enable a step by step approach while
meeting the positions of delegations wanting a single annex and comprehensive
coverage. It would require a decision as to which schedules should be
developed first, but this might be guided by COMNAP' s identification of the
most pressing area of concern - damage from environmental emergencies - on
which we already have a substantial proposal before us. Another possibility
might be to consider parallel work on the prevention of damage, which would
require closely integrated input from a range of disciplines including scientists
and operators. Care would obviously need to be taken to ensure that the
schedules did not overlap unduly, and also that the sequential entry into force
of the schedules did not create problems for one schedule vis-a-vis another.
I would recommend this to colleagues as a possible way forward. If not,
we need to find some other approach to bridge these fundamental differences.
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IV. POSSIBLE FRAMEWORK FOR ANNEX VITO THE PROTOCOL ON ENVIRON-
MENTAL PROTECTION TO THE ANTARCTIC TREATY LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE
To THE ANTARCTIC ENVIRONMENT
A. Purpose
B. Scope of Application
C. Relationship with Other International Agreements
D. Definitions
For the purposes of this Annex (including the Schedules hereto as
appropriate):
"Fund" means...
"Operator" means...
"Person" means...
"Protocol" means
...[other terms which may be common to the Annex and the Schedules...]
E. Obligations of Parties
F. Establishment of Jurisdiction
G. Schedules
To enable the effective implementation of this Annex, the Parties
undertake to adopt measures, in accordance with Article IX(i) of the Antarctic
Treaty, comprising the following Schedules to this Annex:
Schedule 1: Preventative Measures
Schedule 2: Damage from Environmental Emergencies
Schedule 3: Response Action and Remedial Action
Schedule 4: Unrepaired and Irreparable Damage
IR Standard of Liability
I Joint and Several Liability
J. State Liability and Responsibility
K Financial Limits
Liability under this Annex shall not exceed the amounts set out in the
relevant Schedule.
2000]
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L Time Limits of Liability
Liability under this Annex shall be subject to any limitation periods set out
in the relevant Schedule.
M. Antarctic Environment Protection Fund
N. Dispute Settlement
0. Amendment or Modification
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V. SCHEDULES TO ANNEX VI
Preventative Measures
Damage from Environmental Emergencies
Response Action and Remedial Action
Unrepaired and Irreparable Damage
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Schedule 1:
Schedule 2:
Schedule 3:
Schedule 4:
